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Newsgathering Takes Flight in Choppy 
Skies: Legal Obstacles Affecting 
Journalistic Drone Use 
Clay Calvert,* Charles D. Tobin,† & Matthew D. Bunker‡ 
 
This Article examines legal challenges confronting journalists who 
use drones to gather images. Initially, it traces the history of drones and 
the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to regulate them, as well 
as new state legislation that aims to restrict drones. This Article then 
illustrates that a wide array of legal remedies already exist for individu-
als harmed by journalistic drone usage, and it argues that calls for addi-
tional, piecemeal state laws to regulate drones are unnecessary and un-
duly hinder First Amendment interests in newsgathering and the pub-
lic’s right to know. Furthermore, this Article asserts that the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence developed in aerial Fourth 
Amendment cases should be brought to bear in drone intrusion cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 1, 2014, journalist Pedro Rivera used his own 
drone to record images from a traffic accident in Hartford, Con-
necticut.1 He flew it about 150 feet above a marked crime scene 
area while standing on public land.2 In a subsequent federal lawsuit, 
                                                                                                                            
1 Susan Campbell, Hartford Drone Case Journalist Still Grounded, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Apr. 26, 2015, at C3. 
2 Id.; see Patrik Jonsson, Groundbreaking Drone Coverage of Tornado Damage Piques Ire 
of FAA, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/ 
0430/Groundbreaking-drone-coverage-of-tornado-damage-piques-ire-of-FAA-video 
[http://perma.cc/GBP8-7CZD] (“Connecticut photographer Pedro Rivera flew a drone 
over a fatal traffic accident on Feb. 1, and he now alleges in a federal lawsuit that two 
Hartford, Conn., police officers demanded that his employer punish him for doing so.”). 
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Rivera alleged that police ordered him to stop the drone and leave 
the scene, and that the officers later complained to his employer 
that he had interfered with a police investigation.3 
In March 2015, however, U.S. District Court Judge Vanessa 
Bryant held in Rivera v. Foley4 that Pedro Rivera failed to state a 
claim against the police for forcing him to bring down the drone. 
Specifically, she concluded the officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity5 against that aspect of Rivera’s First Amendment6 claim 
because there was no clearly established right in that jurisdiction—
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—to record police 
activity.7 The court further found that even if there were such a 
clearly established right to record police conduct, it applies only to 
handheld recording devices wielded by journalists on terra firma.8 
Rivera, on the other hand, “directed a flying object into a police-
restricted area, where it proceeded to hover over the site of a major 
motor vehicle accident and the responding officers within it, effec-
tively trespassing onto an active crime scene.”9 
Rivera may well be the first reported decision involving the le-
gal rights of broadcast reporters flying drones, but it certainly 
won’t be the last. And despite the discouraging result for news or-
                                                                                                                            
3 Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *4–5 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015). 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at *26; see generally Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (finding that 
“[a] government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the 
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of 
the challenged conduct”) (emphasis added); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 
(2009) (observing that “[q]ualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct 
violated a clearly established constitutional right”). 
6 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety 
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamental 
liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
7 Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *25–26. 
8 See id. at *24–25 (noting that “in cases where the right to record police activity has 
been recognized by our sister circuits, it appears that the protected conduct has typically 
involved using a handheld device to photograph or videotape at a certain distance from, and 
without interfering with, the police activity at issue”) (emphasis added). 
9 Id. at *25. 
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ganizations, it seems unlikely that future courts will be quite as 
dismissive of drone use by reporters as the Rivera court. 
Drones (technically referred to as “unmanned aircraft sys-
tems,” or “UAS”)10 are on the cusp of becoming major drivers of 
technological and economic change. Initially known for their role in 
warfare and antiterrorism,11 drones carry the potential to generate 
innovation in numerous domains beyond newsgathering, including 
law enforcement, utility maintenance, scientific research, and busi-
ness.12 Many people became aware of the economic promise of 
drones when Amazon chief executive officer Jeff Bezos appeared 
on 60 Minutes to demonstrate their potential for rapid order deli-
very.13 
For news operations, drones have enormous advantages. Not 
only are drones often vastly less expensive for the media to operate 
than manned aircraft, but, as one Congressional Research Service 
report put it: “they can operate in dangerous areas without putting 
a human operator at risk of danger; can carry sophisticated surveil-
lance technology; can fly in areas not currently accessible to tradi-
tional aircraft; and can stay in flight for long durations.”14 Already, 
despite Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) limitations, 
                                                                                                                            
10 ALISA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., INTEGRATION OF 
DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 n.1 (2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [http://perma.cc/76ME-KEHK]. 
11 See generally Doyle McManus, Are We Winning the Drone War?, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, May 1, 2015, at A-8 (noting that “the drone wars began” eight years ago in 
2008, and arguing that the Obama administration needs “a top-to-bottom review of its 
drone policies—focused not only on targeting rules, but also on costs and benefits”); 
Scott Shane, Ghosts in the Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2015, at A1 (describing the 
use of drones by the United States under President Barack Obama to target terrorists, and 
noting that the “drone’s vaunted capability for pinpoint killing appealed to a president 
intrigued by a new technology and determined to try to keep the United States out of new 
quagmires”). 
12 See infra Part I (describing the history of drone use). 
13 See Doug Gross, Amazon’s Drone Delivery: How Would it Work?, CNN (Dec. 2, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/02/tech/innovation/amazon-drones-questions/ 
[http://perma.cc/PWZ4-6WWX]; Alexis C. Madrigal, A Drone Scholar Answers the Big 
Questions About Amazon’s Plans, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2013/12/a-drone-scholar-answers-the-big-questions-about-amazons-
plans/282009/ [http://perma.cc/NZZ8-B8K7]. 
14 DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 17. 
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dramatic video footage has demonstrated the power of drone jour-
nalism.15 
The current legal landscape of drone journalism, however, is 
chaotically confused. Although the FAA asserts that commercial-
media use of drones must be expressly authorized by the FAA,16 
there are some signs the agency may yet relax that regulatory 
stance,17 including a recent agreement by the FAA with news or-
ganizations to test drones in partnership with Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”).18 An added layer 
of complexity arises from state statutory regulation of drone use, 
with forty-five states considering more than 160 bills in 2015 
alone.19 
This Article clarifies the most important legal issues surround-
ing media use of drones today. It also argues that existing legal 
principles governing newsgathering and privacy are sufficient to 
resolve concerns about media drone use. Scant legal literature on 
                                                                                                                            
15 See, e.g., Fire Rips Through Brooklyn Recycling Plant: Drone Captures Flames on Video, 
NBC N.Y. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Brooklyn-
Warehouse-Fire-Greenpoint-250886721.html [http://perma.cc/RJ9K-UVSE]. 
16 See Memorandum from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations, 
Fed. Aviation Admin., to James H. Williams, Manager, Unmanned Aircraft Integration 
Office, Fed. Aviation Admin. (May 5, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ 
headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/interpretations/data/interps/2015/
williams-afs-80%20-%20(2015)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf [http://perma.cc/4H9P-
GVMY]. 
17 See Al Tompkins, What the FAA’s Newly Proposed Drone Rules Mean to Journalists, 
POYNTER (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/320079/what-the-
faas-newly-proposed-drone-rules-mean-to-journalists [http://perma.cc/FD2Z-TSNK]; 
Mark Waite, New Rules Governing Drone Journalism Are on the Way—and There’s Reason 
to Be Optimistic, NIEMAN LAB (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.niemanlab.org/2015/02/new-
rules-governing-drone-journalism-are-on-the-way-and-theres-reason-to-be-optimistic 
[http://perma.cc/ZC8F-Z6LJ]. 
18 Ravi Somaiya, Times and Other News Organizations to Test Use of Drones, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/media/10-
companies-join-effort-to-test-drones-for-newsgathering.html [http://perma.cc/HJ4V-
RSTS]. The FAA also has granted an exemption to CNN for drone flights for 
photography, with severe restrictions on who may operate the drones and under what 
conditions. David Goldman, CNN Cleared to Test Drones for Reporting, CNN (Jan. 12, 
2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/12/technology/cnn-drone/ [http://perma 
.cc/A4PY-RDBD]. 
19 Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-
aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx [http://perma.cc/UG5P-9XP5]. 
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drones and newsgathering now exists,20 and the authors of this Ar-
ticle believe it provides significant original analysis of tort-based 
drone issues that advances scholarship on this important topic. 
Part I provides an account of the legal background of media 
drone use, including the current status of FAA regulation and state 
statutory law. Part II explores three key newsgathering challenges 
that almost certainly will arise as drone use for newsgathering proli-
ferates. Those challenges are: (1) legal limits on photographing po-
lice activities; (2) restrictions imposed by the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion; and (3) limits created through trespass law, anti-
paparazzi statutes, and similar legal doctrines. Finally, this Article 
concludes by arguing that existing doctrines, tailored to fit specific 
news-drone uses, already provide sufficient mechanisms to balance 
the public and media’s First Amendment newsgathering interests 
with individual interests in property, privacy, and safety. 
I. EVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF 
DRONE OPERATIONS 
This Part has four sections. Initially, Section A provides a brief 
history of drones and aerial photography, while Section B then 
traces FAA efforts to regulate drone usage. Next, Section C ana-
lyzes the FAA’s case against a drone enthusiast named Raphael 
“Trappy” Pirker. Finally, Section D explores current efforts to re-
gulate drones. 
A. History of Drones and Photography 
Unmanned aircraft systems—“UAS” in government jargon or 
“drones” in common parlance—have existed in one form or 
                                                                                                                            
20 See, e.g., Donna A. Dulo, Drones and the Media: First and Fourth Amendment Issues in 
Technological Framework, 5 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 217 (2014); Benjamin D. Mathews, 
Potential Tort Liability for Personal Use of Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573 (2015); 
Mickey H. Osterreicher, Charting the Course for Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in 
Newsgathering, 2014 PEPP. L. REV. 101 (2014); Nabiha Syed & Michael Berry, Journo-
Drones: A Flight over the Legal Landscape, 30-JUN COMM. LAW. 1 (2014). There is also 
growing literature on Fourth Amendment issues in drone use, a topic this Article does not 
address. See, e.g., Taly Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The 
Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 265 (2015). 
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another since pre-Civil War days, mostly as vehicles of warfare. 
The Habsburg Austrian Empire used ordnance-laden balloons to 
quell the Venetian uprising in 1849.21 Airplane co-inventor Orville 
Wright and business partner Charles Kettering developed the 
“Kettering Bug,” denominated the world’s first “self-flying aerial 
torpedo,” during World War I in a secret U.S. government labora-
tory.22 The Cold War brought jet-powered drones,23 and with the 
1960 downing over the Soviet Union of a U-2 spy plane and the 
capture of U.S. serviceman Gary Powers, the American military 
stepped up development of drones to lower risk to human pilots.24 
The Obama Administration has increased its use of drones from 
that of its predecessors’ to target terrorists in the Middle East and 
Africa.25 
Paralleling the rise in military development, recreational drone 
operators have enjoyed flights of radio-controlled aircraft for sever-
al generations. The community of hobbyists who spent their spare 
time building and flying radio-controlled aircraft came together in 
1936 to form the Academy of Model Aeronautics (“AMA”).26 The 
AMA began developing community-based safety and flight training 
programs and other standards for recreationalists.27 The organiza-
tion currently boasts more than 175,000 members.28 
                                                                                                                            
21 Brian Holman, The First Air Bomb: Venice, 15 July 1849, AIRMINDED BLOG (Aug. 22, 
2009), http://airminded.org/2009/08/22/the-first-air-bomb-venice-15-july-1849/ 
[http://perma.cc/UR27-439K]. 
22 Jimmy Stamp, World War I: 100 Years Later, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanned-drones-have-been-around-
since-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/2N3E-N33G]. 
23 JOHN DAVID BLOM, CSI OCCASIONAL PAPER 37, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51 (2010), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/ 
csipubs/OP37.pdf [http://perma.cc/7T89-6AX4]. 
24 See id. at 56. 
25 See Jack Serie, Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert U.S. Drone Strikes Since Obama 
Inauguration Six Years Ago: The Bureau’s Report for January 2015, BUREAU 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ 
2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-inauguration/ 
[http://perma.cc/UY8Y-G3VM]. 
26 ACAD. MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/ [http://perma 
.cc/JAF4-4QUL] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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Progress in mobile technology for photography has tracked that 
of government and civilian drone technology. In 1858, French pho-
tographer Gaspar Felix Tournachon used a tethered balloon to cap-
ture the first known aerial photographs, over the village of Petit-
Becetre Paris.29 In 1906, George R. Lawrence deployed a system of 
seventeen kites to lift heavy camera equipment for panoramic pho-
tography of the devastation wrought by the San Francisco earth-
quake and fire.30 
But it was the Eastman Kodak Company’s 1888 introduction of 
the Brownie camera—the first mass-produced, easily portable 
model—that launched more than a century of debate over privacy 
and the press. As the Brownie quickly became popular, many de-
cried the rise of “camera fiends” who brought their Brownies to all 
manner of public gatherings.31 Municipal beaches, and even the 
Washington Monument, began to ban their use.32 And the advent 
of the Brownie, in part, led Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis two 
years later to worry that “modern devices afford abundant oppor-
tunities for the perpetration” of invasive wrongs, and to wonder 
“whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be 
invoked to protect the privacy of the individual.”33 Today, nearly 
every court ruling on privacy and the press finds its origins in War-
ren and Brandeis’ seminal article,34 which was largely prompted as 
a fearful backlash to the emerging hobbyists’ and professional pho-
tographers’ communities. 
                                                                                                                            
29 History of Aerial Photography, PROF. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N, 
http://professionalaerialphotographers.com/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=808138
&module_id=158950 [http://perma.cc/PK8U-EPYK] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
30 Id. 
31 See David Lindsay, The Kodak Camera Starts a Craze, PUB. BROAD. SERV., 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eastman/peopleevents/pande13.html 
[http://perma.cc/B2SM-36M4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
32 See id. 
33 Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
34 For a few recent examples that demonstrate the continuing impact of the Warren 
and Brandeis article on modern privacy law, see Peckham v. New England Newspapers, 
Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129–30 (D. Mass. 2012); Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. 
HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1137 n.13 (W.D. Wash. 2011); Curran 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *3 (W.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 
2008). 
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B. The Federal Government Regulates Model Aircraft Hobbyists 
The public and news media remain understandably confused 
as to the state of regulation when it comes to the right to fly 
drones. Indeed, for years the government gave little guidance, 
likely because it did not want to impede recreational use of ra-
dio-controlled hobby aircraft. Imagine the embarrassing head-
lines that might result from the government slapping a twelve-
year-old with a hefty fine for flying his or her birthday present 
too close to people in the local park. 
For this reason, until recent years, the FAA—the sub-
agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation charged 
with policing safety in the national airspace—took a fairly gentle 
approach. In 1981, for example, the FAA released a set of guide-
lines, developed in cooperation with the AMA, that made clear 
no FAA approval was required to fly a hobby drone if the opera-
tor observed certain parameters.35 These included a flight ceil-
ing of 400 feet above the ground and holding off on flights near 
spectators until the drone had been tested and proven airwor-
thy.36 The guidelines did not discuss any business use for 
drones. 
Then, in 2007, recognizing that drone use was “a quickly 
growing and important industry,” the FAA issued a policy advi-
sory.37 The policy advisory stated that the FAA’s previous 
guidance on drone operations “only applies to modelers, and 
thus specifically excludes its use by persons or companies for 
business purposes.”38 Businesses using drones, according the 
this pronouncement, labored under the “mistaken understand-
                                                                                                                            
35 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING 
STANDARDS (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/ 
91-57.pdf [http://perma.cc/J82P-LNNQ]. In recently tightening-up drone regulation, the 
FAA rescinded these guidelines on September 2, 2015 and supplanted them with a new 
set of “Model Aircraft Operating Standards.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY 
CIRCULAR 91-57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATION STANDARDS (2015), http://www.faa 
.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DH63-ELLY] [hereinafter ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57A]. 
36 See ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57A, supra note 35. 
37 Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689 
(Feb. 13, 2007). 
38 Id. at 6690. 
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ing that they are legally operating.”39 The advisory failed to 
provide a definition of “business purposes” or any guidance for 
civilian use of drones by most businesses. 
No path to the lawful commercial use of drones would 
emerge for another five years, when, at the urging of the Obama 
Administration, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012.40 The Act mandated the FAA to “provide 
for the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into 
the national airspace system as soon as practicable, but not later 
than September 30, 2015.”41 Congress, not wanting to force the 
industry to be entirely grounded for three more years, included 
an all-important provision into the Act. Section 333 required the 
Secretary of Transportation to “determine if certain unmanned 
aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace sys-
tem before completion” of final plans to integrate commercial 
drones.42 
Since the Act, and through the end of 2015, the FAA has 
granted more than three thousand section 333 exemptions for 
commercial drone operations, ranging from pipeline inspections 
to closed-set filmmaking.43 The exemptions contain stringent 
limitations, such as restricting the person operating the drones’ 
controls to licensed pilots who have received an FAA medical 
certificate, bans on nighttime flights, and bans on flights over 
crowds of people.44 
                                                                                                                            
39 Id. 
40 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (Feb. 
14, 2012). 
41 Id. § 332(a)(3). 
42 Id. § 333. 
43 Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/ 
[http://perma.cc/5E5H-J4CA] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
44 See Section 333 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_faqs/ 
[http://perma.cc/3QMT-NMPA] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
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C. The Pirker Case: The FAA Wins Challenge by Commercial 
Drone Photographer 
The incident that awakened the news media to the drone 
regulatory environment was a legal challenge brought by freel-
ance photographer Raphael “Trappy” Pirker.45 A cult hero of 
sorts to model pilots and photographers, Pirker in 2011 flew a 
camera-equipped, fixed-wing, styrofoam-constructed Ritewing 
Zephyr drone around the grounds of the University of Virginia, 
on an assignment from an advertising company.46 Pirker’s 
breathtaking video, posted on YouTube,47 caught the attention 
of the FAA, which issued a $10,000 civil penalty alleging that 
he conducted a “careless or reckless operation of an unmanned 
aircraft” in violation of FAA safety regulations.48 
Pirker, relying on the murky state of the FAA’s regulatory 
scheme, initially won dismissal of the fine in an administrative 
hearing on grounds that what he flew was a model, not an “air-
craft” under federal regulations, and that the government had 
no authority to regulate model flights.49 On November 18, 2014, 
however, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), 
which acts as the appellate body for FAA administrative rulings, 
sided with the government. It broadly held that the FAA pos-
sessed authority to regulate any “aircraft”—model or commer-
cial.50 Pirker settled with the FAA shortly after the ruling.51 
                                                                                                                            
45 See Julianne Chiaet, Drone Pilot Challenges FAA on Commercial Flying Ban, SCI. AM. 
(Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/drone-pilot-challenges-faa-
commercial-flying-ban/ [http://perma.cc/ANZ5-KJFQ]. 
46 Id. 
47 sUAS News, Stunt Sheep Don’t Try This at Home: Trappys $10k Fine UVA Video, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZnJeuAja-4 
[http://perma.cc/3C9K-NCB3]. 
48 Opinion and Order at 1–2, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. 2014), 
http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/5730.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HXS-ZUYN]. 
Specifically, the FAA charged Pirker with violating 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a), which prohibits 
operation of “an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or 
property of another.” Id. at 2 n.2. 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 See id. at 4–7. 
51 Jack Nicas, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Settles with Videographer over 
Drones, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-federal-aviation-
administration-settles-with-videographer-over-drones-1421960972 
[http://perma.cc/T4AC-VDWG]. 
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Pirker’s case, as it involved photographers’ rights, galva-
nized the media community. Briefs supporting his cause were 
filed by a number of photography and news media interests, in-
cluding a coalition of twenty-two cable and broadcast networks 
and ownership groups.52 These briefs argued that the news me-
dia’s and public’s First Amendment interest in newsgathering 
required the government to take special care only to enact nar-
rowly tailored restrictions that accomplish compelling safety 
goals.53 Unfortunately, in its ruling in the government’s favor, 
the NTSB sidestepped that issue entirely. 
Nonetheless, the ruling led to the continued collaboration 
among the news media to press the government for narrow re-
strictions that will preserve maximum opportunities to gather 
news with drones. Many news companies that participated in 
the coalition, for example, have joined a program under an FAA 
license to Virginia Tech to test drones under real-life news sce-
narios.54 
D. Current Developments in Drone Regulation 
1. Federal Regulatory Efforts & Media Organizations’ 
Input 
The FAA in February 2015, as Congress had required, re-
leased a proposed regulation for commercial drone use, includ-
ing a weight limit on the aircraft of fifty-five pounds.55 The pro-
posed regulation contains many of the same restrictions as the 
section 333 exemptions: licensed pilots, no nighttime flights, 
and very limited ability to fly in populated areas.56 
                                                                                                                            
52 Brief of News Media as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Pirker, No. CP-217, 
https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/AmicusBriefNewsMedia.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YME6-JQC3] [hereinafter News Media Brief]. 
53 See generally id. 
54 See Brian Stelter, Major Media Companies Unite to Test ‘News Drones,’ CNNMONEY 
(June 16, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/16/media/media-coalition-news-
drones/ [http://perma.cc/4D8D-LPB8]. 
55 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 
9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015). 
56 See Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.
pdf [http://perma.cc/J59T-WLGV] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
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The proposal also contains, however, a suggestion that the 
FAA may enact a separate rule for “micro” drones weighing 
4.4 pounds or less, which would include most of the less expen-
sive models that newsrooms seek to use.57 While the ban on 
nighttime flights and other restrictions would apply, the FAA’s 
proposed rule contemplates that a proficiency test, but no pi-
lot’s license or medical certification, would be required—a far 
more practical and helpful criterion for most broadcasters.58 
The FAA is not expected to enact this final rule until 2017.59 
More than 4,500 people and organizations filed comments to 
the proposed rule.60 The same news media coalition that sup-
ported Pirker’s battle with the FAA filed comments that were 
largely supportive of the proposed regulation, but encouraged 
further regulatory relaxation to maximize opportunities to use 
drones in daily newsgathering.61 
On the same day as the FAA released the proposed rule, 
President Obama issued an executive memorandum requiring 
the National Telecommunications Infrastructure Agency 
(“NTIA”), a component of the Department of Commerce, to 
convene a “multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop 
and communicate best practices for privacy, accountability, and 
transparency issues regarding commercial and private UAS 
use.”62 The NTIA is currently holding open meetings with var-
                                                                                                                            
57 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
9556–58. 
58 See id. 
59 Brian Fung, The FAA Won’t Make Up Its Mind on Drone Rules Until 2017—at the 
Earliest, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/12/10/the-faa-wont-make-up-its-mind-on-drone-rules-until-2017-at-
the-earliest/ [http://perma.cc/3W3K-7EB8]. 
60 Docket Folder Summary—Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2015-
0150 [http://perma.cc/CY9U-D93S] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
61 See News Media Coalition, Comment Letter on Operation and Certification of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.medialaw.org/images/ 
medialawdaily/05.04.15faacomment.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ED2-49RX]. 
62 Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding 
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/ 
15/presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua 
[http://perma.cc/FP82-CEYZ]. 
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ious industries interested in the use of drone technology.63 The 
news media is participating in the meetings, and has filed writ-
ten comments urging that the federal government look to exist-
ing state law and not enact any new federal drone regulations for 
civilian use.64 
In one significant regulatory development, the news media 
secured a crucial concession from the FAA’s lawyers. In 2013, 
an FAA spokesperson had warned a Dayton, Ohio journalist 
against posting hobbyist-filmed drone video of a fire, which had 
been offered to the newspaper; the newspaper had no involve-
ment in the flight, but cautiously called the FAA to ask about 
the legality of using the video.65 First Amendment law would 
strongly counsel that, absent any involvement by journalists in 
unlawfully flying a drone, receiving footage would constitute 
“lawfully obtaining” the material, and a constitutional right to 
publish the footage, if newsworthy, would attach.66 The news 
media complained that the FAA’s arbitrary warning to the Day-
ton newspaper was unconstitutional.67 
At the urging of the news media, the FAA in May 2015 pub-
lished a legal opinion sharply drawing the distinction between 
the unlawful operation of a drone itself and the lawful publica-
tion of newsworthy, drone-captured images.68 The opinion 
made clear that, if a news outlet does not operate or control the 
drone, the FAA cannot punish it for accepting drone images: 
                                                                                                                            
63 See Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. 
ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2015/multi 
stakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems [http://perma.cc/Q8Y2-FJGH]. 
64 See Letter from Charles D. Tobin, Attorney for Cox Media Grp., LLC, to Nat’l 
Telecomm. & Info. Admin. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ 
cox_media_group_llc_04_20_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3G45-GQZX]. 
65 See Tristan Navera, Why You Won’t See Drone Footage from Downtown Fire on Our 
Site, DAYTON BUS. J. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/blog/2014/ 
04/why-you-won-t-see-drone-footage-from-downtown-fire.html 
[http://perma.cc/X3AM-X9A7]. 
66 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court held that a journalist who received a 
recording of an illegally taped telephone conversation, with no involvement in or notice of 
the illegal taping, had “lawfully obtained” the recording. 532 U.S. 514, 514–15 (2001). 
The Court further held that, as the tape contained newsworthy information, the First 
Amendment precluded punishment when the journalist broadcast it on the radio. Id. 
67 See News Media Brief, supra note 52, at 9–10. 
68 Memorandum from Mark W. Bury to James H. Williams, supra note 16. 
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“A media entity that does not have operational control of the 
UAS and is otherwise not involved in its operation falls outside 
of the FAA’s oversight.”69 The opinion even authorizes pay-
ment after-the-fact: “Whether the media entity pays for or ob-
tains the pictures, videos, or other information for free would 
not affect this analysis.”70 
The opinion makes crystal clear, however, that in the FAA’s 
view, freelancers or employees of media companies must obtain 
FAA clearance to fly newsgathering drone missions: “A person 
who wishes to operate a UAS to take pictures or videos or gath-
er other information that then would be sold to media outlets 
would need an FAA authorization for the operation.”71 
2. State and Local Governments Create Stormy Skies for 
Drone Journalism 
As the federal government tries to bring predictability to 
drone regulation, a number of states72—and even some munici-
palities73—have enacted drone regulations of their own. Some of 
these laws pose few problems for journalists. Maine’s law, for 
example, is aimed solely at law enforcement, providing detailed 
requirements for issuance of warrants for drone surveillance, a 
ban on police use of biometric technology, and a right for citi-
                                                                                                                            
69 Id. at 2. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 A collection of the current state drone laws is found at the National Conference of 
State Legislatures’ website. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra 
note 19. 
73 In March 2015, the city council of Berkeley, California enacted a one-year 
moratorium on police use of drones, even though its police chief said acquiring a drone is 
“not on our radar.” Emilie Raguso, Council: No Drones for Berkeley Police for 1 Year, 
BERKELEYSIDE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2015/03/02/council-no-
drones-for-berkeley-police-for-1-year/ [http://perma.cc/P4PM-VPMA]. The Augusta-
Richmond County (Georgia) Commission, in the run-up to the 2015 Masters 
Tournament at the Augusta National Golf Club, enacted an ordinance banning all drone 
flights during April 2–13, 2015. See Alex Miceli, PGA Tour: Drones Banned over Augusta 
During Masters, GOLFWEEK (Mar. 20, 2015), http://golfweek.com/news/2015/mar/20/ 
masters-2015-augusta-national-drones-banned/ [http://perma.cc/H34D-KFYY]. 
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zens to sue an police agency for violations.74 Michigan’s drone 
laws simply prohibit using drones to interfere with hunting.75 
Other states’ laws, however, are fraught with significant 
First Amendment problems that will cloud the skies for broad-
casters who want to use drones. Florida’s new statute, for ex-
ample, provides a private right of action against a drone opera-
tor who, “with the intent to conduct surveillance,” captures 
images of private property—even unoccupied property—”in 
violation of such person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
without his or her written consent.”76 That leaves a lot of re-
porters covering hurricane damage, an unfortunately common 
occurrence in Florida, to wonder whether drone news photo-
graphy exposes them to significant legal risk.77 
Texas has perhaps the most hostile statute for drone journal-
ism, with the potential jailing of broadcasters for violations. 
Texas’ drone statute makes it a misdemeanor for any person to 
use “an unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual 
or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to 
conduct surveillance on the individual or property captured in 
the image.”78 The statute goes even further, providing for mis-
demeanor punishment, not only for the unlawful operation of a 
drone, but additionally for the “disclosure, display, distribution, 
or other use of an image” captured during a prohibited drone 
flight.79 Texas also permits the “owner or tenant of privately 
owned” property to sue the drone operator for civil damages for 
capturing “an image of the property or the owner or tenant.”80 
North Carolina, by contrast, sensibly included an exception in 
                                                                                                                            
74 ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 4501 (2015). 
75 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.40111c(2) (2016) (prohibiting hunting via drone); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 324.40112(2)(c) (2015) (prohibiting interfering with hunting via drone). 
76 FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(b) (2015). 
77 Jensen Werley, Florida’s New Drone Laws Could Create Big Problems for One Major 
Industry, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (May 18, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
jacksonville/news/2015/05/18/floridas-new-drone-laws-could-create-big-problems.html 
[http://perma.cc/QV28-RBDP]. 
78 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003(a) (West 2015). 
79 Id. § 423.003(b). 
80 Id. § 423.006(a). 
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its drone law for “news gathering, newsworthy events, or places 
to which the general public is invited.”81 
II. NAVIGATING NEWSGATHERING CHALLENGES 
AND OBSTACLES: THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE 
CONFRONTING DRONE USAGE 
This Part explores the potential liabilities facing broadcast 
journalists who hope to use drones to gather news. Specifically, 
Section A returns to the Rivera case noted in the Introduction and 
examines in greater detail the contested terrain of the nascent, 
qualified First Amendment right to record police performing duties 
in public places. Section B then explores potential civil liability for 
drone usage under the tort theory of intrusion into seclusion. Final-
ly, Section C delves into a range of extant statutes and common-
law theories, stretching from anti-paparazzi statutes to the tradi-
tional torts of trespass and infliction of emotional distress, courts 
may come to apply when confronted with cases involving drone 
journalism. Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that the law already 
furnishes multiple legal limitations on drone use by journalists, as 
well as numerous potential remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs. Add-
ing even more new statutory liability, as some states have been ea-
ger to do, thus amounts to legislative overkill and chills First 
Amendment freedoms. 
A. Using Drones to Film Police Performing Duties in Public Places: 
The Unsettled State of the Law and a Troubling Decision 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether 
the First Amendment provides the right to capture images of law 
enforcement personnel carrying out their duties in public venues.82 
Establishing this right, however, would seem to flow logically 
from several well-established principles. 
                                                                                                                            
81 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1(b)(2) (2015). 
82 See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1057 (D.N.M. 2014) 
(“Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed a right—
constitutional or otherwise—to record police or law enforcement activity in public.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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Specifically, the Supreme Court recognizes that images, not 
merely spoken and written words,83 are protected by the First 
Amendment.84 Additionally, courts are clear that people—in 
this case, police officers—do not possess reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy when they are situated in public places, such as 
streets and sidewalks where much police work occurs.85 Fur-
thermore, the conduct of police, as government officials, is a mat-
ter of public concern, and speech regarding matters of public con-
cern is, as the Supreme Court reiterated in 2011, at the heart of the 
First Amendment.86 
Despite this trio of indubitable propositions, and in the ab-
sence of any guidance from the nation’s high court, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Vanessa Bryant of Connecticut found a split of au-
thority in March 2015 among the federal appellate circuits when 
it comes to the right to record police.87 She observed in Rivera 
v. Foley—the drone journalism-based case addressed above in 
the Introduction—that “[t]he First Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Ele-
venth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit all recognize that the First 
Amendment protects the photography and recording of police of-
ficers engaged in their official duties . . . . The Third Circuit and 
the Fourth Circuit take the contrary approach.”88 
Most recently, the First Circuit, with its 2014 ruling in Ge-
ricke v. Begin,89 squarely recognized a First Amendment right to 
                                                                                                                            
83 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(observing that “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of 
expression”). 
84 See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (concluding that “expression by means of motion 
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments”). 
85 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (reasoning that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection”); Jackson v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding no expectation of privacy in a tort case where the plaintiffs 
“were on a city sidewalk in plain view of the public eye”). 
86 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011). 
87 Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015). 
88 Id. Judge Bryant noted that, outside of the Second Circuit, “[o]ther circuits are split 
on this issue.” Id. 
89 See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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film government officials, including police officers, performing 
their duties in public places.90 The court observed that First 
Amendment principles regarding gathering information about gov-
ernment officials “apply equally to the filming of a traffic stop and 
the filming of an arrest in a public park.”91 It emphasized that “[a] 
traffic stop, no matter the additional circumstances, is inescapably 
a police duty carried out in public. Hence, a traffic stop does not 
extinguish an individual’s right to film.”92 
The federal circuits recognizing a First Amendment right to 
record police, however, all have made it clear that this right is qual-
ified, not absolute, and must be balanced against the reasonable 
needs of law enforcement. For instance, the First Circuit in Gericke 
wrote that “[r]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to 
film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them.”93 It 
added that “a police order that is specifically directed at the First 
Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public 
may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably 
conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, 
with his duties.”94 A vast problem for broadcast journalists, regard-
less of whether they use drones or other technologies, is the nebu-
lousness of this reasonableness standard, especially when courts 
are likely to grant vast deference to police when evaluating if a re-
striction on the right to record is reasonable. 
The drone-based decision of Rivera v. Foley95—the only case of 
its kind as of late 2015—occurred at the district court level within 
the Second Circuit, which has yet to directly address the right-to-
record-police issue. Rivera, however, suggests that some judges are 
reticent to recognize a First Amendment right to record police us-
ing drones, especially when they fly above where police are work-
ing.96 
                                                                                                                            
90 See id. at 7–10. 
91 Id. at 7. 
92 See id. 
93 Id. (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
95 No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015). 
96 See id. at *24. Moreover, the FAA is enlisting the assistance of local law enforcement 
to spot civil infractions of federal drone-safety regulations. See Law Enforcement Guidance 
for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
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As noted in the Introduction, Pedro Rivera used a drone during 
daylight hours to record a vehicular accident scene.97 Importantly, 
he stood outside of the crime-scene area and flew the drone about 
150 feet directly above it.98 Were the images important, powerful, 
and newsworthy? As succinctly noted in the Columbia Journalism 
Review, Rivera’s images “gave an unsettling panorama of the crash 
scene, including the car’s wrinkled steel frame compressed into a 
brick wall as police worked the scene. Rivera’s tape had a vivid, 
eyewitness feel that far surpassed the quality of shots from came-
ramen behind yellow police tape.”99 
Rather than embracing this enhanced public perspective into 
the issue of highway safety and police responsiveness, when Judge 
Bryant watched the video she saw only an alleged incursion into a 
controlled crime scene. She was reluctant to acknowledge a First 
Amendment right to record based on these facts, instead reasoning 
that Pedro Rivera: 
[D]irected a flying object into a police-restricted 
area, where it proceeded to hover over the site of a 
major motor vehicle accident and the responding of-
ficers within it, effectively trespassing onto an active 
crime scene . . . . Even if recording police activity 
were a clearly established right in the Second Cir-
cuit, Plaintiff’s conduct is beyond the scope of that 
right as it has been articulated by other circuits.100 
She added that in those cases “where the right to record police 
activity has been recognized by our sister circuits, it appears that 
the protected conduct has typically involved using a handheld de-
vice to photograph or videotape at a certain distance from, and 
without interfering with, the police activity at issue.”101 In brief, 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_ 
Guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/C583-NPPU] (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). This may 
encourage police agencies to more vigorously restrict drone journalism than their police 
powers ordinarily would permit. 
97 Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *3. 
98 See id. 
99 Louise Roug, Eye in the Sky, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.cjr.org/cover_story/eye_in_the_sky.php [http://perma.cc/2QGU-73D8]. 
100 Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *26 (emphasis added). 
101 Id. at *24–25. 
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Judge Bryant found that cases involving handheld devices were dis-
tinguishable from drones and, in turn, she held a drone flying about 
fifty yards—half of a football field—above a crime scene consti-
tutes an aerial trespass. 
Perhaps most troubling here is the deference Judge Bryant gave 
police in restricting drone use. She opined that Pedro Rivera’s 
“operation of an unusual and likely unidentified device into a cor-
doned-off area at the scene of a major motor vehicle accident and 
ongoing police investigation provides arguable reasonable suspicion 
that Plaintiff was interfering with police activity.”102 
Additionally, Jude Bryant created a problematic dichotomy be-
tween vertical and horizontal distances. As Professor Eugene Vo-
lokh asserted: 
[I]t’s not clear to me why video recording a scene 
from 150 feet above is any more of an intrusion into 
a police investigation than video recording it from 
150 feet away horizontally or diagonally (if the drone 
had been off to the side but looking down at angle), 
at least unless a police helicopter was nearby or was 
likely to be nearby.103 
Indeed, it is the same knotty horizontal-versus-vertical dichot-
omy that Matthew Shroyer, president of the Professional Society of 
Drone Journalists, echoed regarding Rivera. He noted: “Other 
photographers who arrived documented the scene with telephoto 
lenses, which were much more intrusive than Rivera’s drone. Yet 
those journalists were never questioned, let alone expelled from the 
scene, pursued, and suspended.”104 
                                                                                                                            
102 Id. at *20 (emphasis added). Query whether the operation of drones today (Rivera 
used his in 2014) is really so “unusual” that an officer can reasonably deem a drone’s 
mere presence—some 150 feet above a crime scene—sufficient to constitute, in and of 
itself, an interference with police activity. As drone use by broadcast journalists 
proliferates, surely this line of logic must eventually fail. 
103 Eugene Volokh, No Drone Surveillance of Crime Scene (Even From 150 Feet Above), 
Police Say, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/30/no-drone-
surveillance-of-crime-scene-even-from-150-feet-above-police-say 
[http://perma.cc/8AF9-3R9X]. 
104 Matthew Shroyer et al., Statement in Support of Pedro Rivera from the Professional 
Society of Drone Journalists, PROF. SOC’Y DRONE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 24, 2014), 
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In fact—and clearly militating in favor of Pedro Rivera—the 
FAA investigated the incident and concluded “there was no evi-
dence of careless or reckless operation or commercial operation of 
the drone in question.”105 All of this calls into question the out-
come in Rivera. An image captured by Pedro Rivera remains online 
today, and the authors recommend that readers review it to see the 
clarity and benefit provided by the use of drone journalism in this 
case.106 
B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Of the four privacy torts, intrusion is the claim a plaintiff’s law-
yer most likely would deploy to attack a journalist’s allegedly inju-
rious use of a camera-equipped drone. According to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts’ majority formulation, intrusion requires 
an intentional intrusion, “physically or otherwise, upon the soli-
tude or seclusion of another or his private affairs . . . if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”107 In determin-
ing if a defendant intrudes on a plaintiff’s “solitude or seclusion,” 
the tort mandates that a plaintiff possess a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”108 This typically limits the tort to places such as the 
inside of a plaintiff’s home, a clothing fitting room, and analogous 
venues—a “private hotel room, ship cabin, house trailer, and hos-
pital room”109—where a plaintiff possesses an expectation of sec-
lusion. 
Intrusion, however, is not coextensive with trespass law (ad-
dressed below in Section C). That’s because some trespasses are 
not tortious for intrusion purposes, while numerous successful in-
                                                                                                                            
http://www.dronejournalism.org/news/2014/2/statement-in-support-of-pedro-rivera-
from-the-professional-society-of-drone-journalists [http://perma.cc/LBA9-GMPN]. 
105 FAA Releases Report on Hartford Drone Incident, FOX 61 (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:54 PM), 
http://foxct.com/2015/01/07/faa-releases-report-on-hartford-drone-incident 
[http://perma.cc/QX69-EBMC] (emphasis added). 
106 To view the image, see Matthew Schroyer, FAA Investigation Finds Connecticut 
Journalist Was Flying Safely and Legally, PROF. SOC’Y DRONE JOURNALISTS (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.dronejournalism.org/news/2015/1/faa-investigation-finds-connect 
icut-drone-journalist-was-flying-safely-and-legally [http://perma.cc/H6BX-86U9]. 
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
108 Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA. 
L. REV. 289, 314 (2002). 
109 DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY 37 (1991). 
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trusion claims do not involve physical trespasses.110 As noted 
above, the intrusion can be physical “or otherwise,” with the 
“otherwise” sweeping up electronic surveillance technologies—
high-powered cameras, for example—and, importantly now, 
drones. 
As mentioned, a reasonable expectation of privacy frequently 
arises when the plaintiff has a justifiable sense she is in a private 
zone of interest. As one commentator put it: “Incorporating impli-
citly or explicitly the standard used by the Supreme Court in 
Fourth Amendment111 cases, the courts have emphasized that the 
common law was and is ‘intended to protect people, not plac-
es.’”112 Thus, in a drone-based scenario, technical questions of cur-
tilage and the like are certainly not dispositive of an intrusion claim. 
The fact that most jurisdictions require the intrusion to be in-
tentional diminishes the tort’s impact in some newsgathering situa-
tions. For example, as one commentator observes, “[i]f a newsga-
thering drone is covering an apartment fire, and, while it does so, 
the operator pans the camera lens or yaws the drone so as to cap-
ture a momentary image through a bedroom window, the intentio-
nality element is not met.”113 Nonetheless, where newsgathering 
drones are purposefully used to gather images from a private loca-
tion—imagine, for instance, a drone hovering over a walled-in 
                                                                                                                            
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
111 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government 
entities and officials. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding, with regard to 
the exclusionary rule adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1924), that “all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that 
same authority, inadmissible in a state court”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) 
(“[W]e have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police 
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
112 ELDER, supra note 109, at 41 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
113 Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 385, 442 (2015). 
558 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:535 
 
backyard otherwise not visible to surrounding neighbors or from 
the street or sidewalk—the act may be tortious. 
There are, as yet, no reported intrusion-by-drone decisions. In-
deed, there are almost no cases dealing with tortious intrusion by 
any aerial technology. One of the very few is Streisand v. Adel-
man,114 an unreported California trial court decision in which singer 
Barbra Streisand sued a photographer who took aerial photos of her 
Malibu home as part of an ecological history initiative. The photo-
grapher shot from a helicopter flying off the coast—rather than di-
rectly over Streisand’s property—at altitudes of 150 to 2,000 
feet.115 Streisand advanced a variety of privacy theories, including 
intrusion. 
The California court, ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion116 by the 
photographer, held that Streisand had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, in part because “occasional overflights are among those 
ordinary incidents of community life of which plaintiff is a part.”117 
The court also reasoned that aerial photography along the pictu-
resque Pacific coast was a “routine activity.”118 It further noted 
that although Streisand’s property was not visible from the street, 
she had “taken no steps to preclude persons passing by in airplanes 
from seeing into her backyard.”119 
The defendant’s own actions also played a key role in the “no 
reasonable expectation” finding. That’s because the defendant did 
not hover over Streisand’s yard to take pictures of her or of some 
social gathering at her house. Nor did operating the helicopter 
create a nuisance—facts the court implied might have changed the 
                                                                                                                            
114 Statement of Decision, Streisand v. Adelman, No. SC 077 257 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 
31, 2003), http://www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/slapp-ruling.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/6S4K-BWDQ]. 
115 See id. at 4. 
116 California’s anti-SLAPP law protects individuals from a “Strategic Lawsuit Against 
Public Participation” (“SLAPP”) and allows them to file a motion to dismiss complaints 
that were intended to censor or silence free speech. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 
(West 2015); Calif. Case Law Is an Excellent Anti-SLAPP Resource, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 
2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/512540/calif-case-law-is-an-excellent-
anti-slapp-resource [https://perma.cc/CL98-TZQ6]. 
117 Statement of Decision, supra note 114, at 32. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
2016] NEWSGATHERING TAKES FLIGHT IN CHOPPY SKIES 559 
 
analysis. As it reasoned, “any intrusion on these facts is de mini-
mis.”120 
The court also analogized to Fourth Amendment cases holding 
that aerial overflight and photography by the government do not 
violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, 
the Streisand court cited California v. Ciraolo,121 a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision finding that a warrantless law enforcement plane 
overflight and photography of the defendant’s backyard at an alti-
tude of 1,000 feet was constitutional, even though the yard was 
surrounded by a ten-foot high fence. Despite that fence, which 
made it impossible for ground-level passersby to peer into the yard, 
the high court reasoned: “In an age where private and commercial 
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respon-
dent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally pro-
tected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 
1,000 feet.”122 
Moreover, the Streisand court held that the singer could not 
prove the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” element of in-
trusion. In particular, the court noted that the defendant “was en-
gaged in his avocation of photographing the California coastline for 
an ecological history project and did not take [the photo] with any 
other purpose in mind.”123 It is not entirely clear that the defen-
dant’s purpose is ordinarily determinative as to the “highly offen-
sive” element,124 but there is precedent suggesting that it is an im-
portant factor. The California Supreme Court in Shulman v. Group 
W Productions, Inc.125 observed that “all the circumstances of an 
intrusion, including the motives or justification of the intruder, are 
                                                                                                                            
120 Id. at 37. 
121 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
122 Id. at 215. 
123 Statement of Decision, supra note 114, at 35. 
124 The Restatement of Torts discussion suggests that the “highly offensive” element 
derives more from the actual conduct of the defendant rather than the ultimate purpose of 
the intrusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
One noted treatise opines that the determination of what is highly offensive in a 
newsgathering context turns on “the location of the subject, the nature of any invitation 
to approach the subject, the presence or absence of electronic devices, and the intensity of 
the approach.” BRUCE SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.2 (1991). 
125 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
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pertinent to the offensiveness element.”126 Thus, a journalist using 
a drone might assert that a First Amendment motive in informing 
the public with images captured of a newsworthy event makes the 
action, per se, not offensive.127 Indeed, in other news tort contexts, 
courts have taken a “news” motive into account to find that the 
journalist’s conduct was lawful.128 
Although Streisand generally seems well reasoned under tradi-
tional intrusion principles, importantly, it is an unreported trial 
court decision with no precedential importance. Still, it likely 
represents—at least in a big picture sense—the sort of contextual, 
fact-intensive reasoning other courts might employ in intrusion-by-
drone scenarios. 
Another aerial intrusion case held that flying model airplanes 
near—and sometimes directly over—the plaintiffs’ property did 
not support a claim of intrusion. In Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, 
Inc.,129 the defendants operated a nonprofit organization that pro-
moted radio-controlled model airplanes. They rented a field near 
                                                                                                                            
126 Id. at 493. 
127 Indeed, the California high court wrote in Shulman that “the constitutional 
protection of the press does reflect the strong societal interest in effective and complete 
reporting of events, an interest that may—as a matter of tort law—justify an intrusion 
that would otherwise be considered offensive.” Id. Yet this noble-motive factor in 
offensiveness is anything but airtight. The Shulman court stressed that “[e]quipment 
such as hidden cameras and miniature cordless and directional microphones are powerful 
investigative tools for newsgathering, but may also be used in ways that severely threaten 
personal privacy. California tort law provides no bright line on this question; each case 
must be taken on its facts.” Id. at 494 (emphasis added). More than fifteen years after that 
language from Shulman, drones now constitute “powerful investigative tools for 
newsgathering,” and the journalists who operate them must be mindful of the case-by-
case nature of the offensiveness inquiry. 
128 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Times Pub. Co., 780 So. 2d 310, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (dismissing claims of tortious interference against media defendant where 
“public interest in the free flow of information,” the “routine newsgathering techniques 
used by the reporter,” and the information obtained that was of public concern militated 
against a finding that reporter had improper motives in newsgathering); Dulgarian v. 
Stone, 652 N.E.2d 603, 609 (Mass. 1995) (granting summary judgment in favor of media 
defendants on tortious interference claims where there was no indication that the 
allegedly defamatory conversation was “carried on for any purpose other than 
journalism”); see also Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Assocs., Ltd., 520 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 
(Sup. Ct. 1987) (rejecting tortious interference claims where “[i]t is clear that if any 
interference occurred it was merely incidental to defendants’ exercise of their 
constitutional rights”). 
129 Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, Inc., 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991). 
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the plaintiffs’ property and regularly flew the planes—which made 
what the plaintiffs described as an irritating sound—in the vicinity 
of the plaintiffs, including some instances in which the planes ac-
tually flew over the plaintiffs’ property or crash landed on it.130 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, applying that state’s statutory 
intrusion doctrine, cited examples from the Restatement that in-
cluded a reporter entering a hospital room to take photographs and 
persons engaging in wiretapping and window peeking.131 The court 
reasoned from these examples that the Nebraska intrusion statute 
was not “designed to protect persons from the type of intrusion 
involved in this case.”132 Although not stating so explicitly, the 
high court seemed to suggest that the model plane flying was de 
minimis compared to the paradigm intrusion cases discussed by the 
Restatement’s authors. Moreover, the court held that the model 
plane activities did not “rise to the level of being ‘highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.’”133 The opinion provided little explana-
tion, however, for this conclusion, although a reasonable assump-
tion is that any offensiveness was relatively minor. 
Kaiser is somewhat analogous to a drone case because modern 
drones, especially the smaller models many news media outlets 
contemplate using, are often roughly the same size as model air-
planes. Unfortunately, the case does not provide an estimate of the 
altitude at which the model planes flew. Unlike the facts that might 
generate a potential media drone intrusion case, of course, the 
planes were not being intentionally flown over the plaintiffs’ prop-
erty and there was no allegation of still or video photography taking 
place. As suggested by the Streisand court, Fourth Amendment 
doctrine features established case law analyzing what precisely 
constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”134 Importantly, 
this might further guide doctrinal development in the intrusion-by-
drone context. 
                                                                                                                            
130 Id. at 559. 
131 See id. at 562. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 The Court’s reasonable expectation jurisprudence requires a two-part inquiry that 
asks whether the defendant has “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and 
whether that expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Yet, there is no complete agreement as to whether the Fourth 
Amendment “reasonable expectation” standard is identical to or 
coextensive with the “reasonable expectation” rubric used in in-
trusion doctrine. In his leading privacy treatise, J. Thomas McCar-
thy suggests the two are the same,135 while the California Supreme 
Court has opined that, at least in an employment context, because 
of “special considerations involved in defining the private citizen’s 
protection against intrusion by the government and the govern-
ment’s unique interest in investigating and suppressing criminal 
activity, decisions discussing employees’ expectations of privacy 
against government searches are not directly applicable to the com-
mon law privacy tort context.”136 
Regardless of the outcome of this technical conundrum, which 
is beyond the scope of this work to resolve, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” already 
has provided useful and persuasive analogies to courts looking for 
guidance in intrusion cases. This is particularly true given the pauc-
ity of tort cases involving aerial intrusion that might be applied to 
drone scenarios; Fourth Amendment law is much more robust in 
this area. 
In Fourth Amendment case law, courts have reached differing 
conclusions regarding a criminal defendant’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy based on factors such as the altitude of the aerial 
observer, the legality of the aircraft’s position in public airspace, 
the speed of the aircraft, the use of special surveillance equipment, 
and the intensity of the surveillance.137 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has decided three aerial surveillance cases, including Ciraolo, dis-
cussed earlier, in which the defendant was found to have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his fenced backyard when police 
photographed it from a plane at 1,000 feet. There was no reasona-
ble expectation despite the fact that the Court considered the back-
yard to be within the “curtilage” area of the defendant’s home.138 
                                                                                                                            
135 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 657–59 (2d ed. 
2015). 
136 Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 74 n.3 (Cal. 1999) (emphasis added). 
137 See Annotation, Aerial Observation or Surveillance as Violative of Fourth 
Amendment Guaranty Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 772 
(1982) (listing relevant cases). 
138 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
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Curtilage is the legal term for surrounding land and buildings close-
ly associated with a house that also merit some level of privacy pro-
tection.139 
The Court, in a sharply divided decision, also found no reason-
able expectation of privacy in Florida v. Riley in 1989.140 Riley in-
volved warrantless police surveillance of a greenhouse behind the 
defendant’s mobile home in a remote area. Police circled twice 
over the property in a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet and ob-
served marijuana plants (there was no still or video photogra-
phy).141 The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Byron 
White, reasoned that, while the defendant had taken precautions to 
prevent surveillance from ground level, the sides and roof of the 
greenhouse were allowed to remain open.142 Nor was the Court 
moved by the fact that the helicopter was flying at an altitude of 
400 feet—that altitude, unlike the 1,000-foot limit for fixed-wing 
aircraft, was a lawful one for a helicopter and, more relevant now 
than ever, is the FAA-mandated ceiling for drone flights.143 The 
Court observed that “there is nothing in the record or before us to 
suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in 
this country to lend substance to respondent’s claim that he rea-
sonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to ob-
servation from that altitude.”144 The quoted statement suggests 
that the fact that a technology is common can tend to diminish the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy; to the extent that 
drones become commonplace, that very fact may well alter the av-
erage person’s reasonable expectation. 
The final case in this Supreme Court aerial trio is Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States.145 It arose when the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency hired an aerial photographer to take warrantless 
pictures from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet above a 
                                                                                                                            
139 See id. at 212–13. 
140 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
141 See id. at 448. 
142 Id. at 450. 
143 The 400-foot ceiling for drone operations is contained in all authorizations granted 
by the FAA pursuant to section 333. See Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 
Exemptions, supra note 43. 
144 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451. 
145 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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Dow plant inaccessible from the ground and that the agency was 
investigating.146 Part of Dow’s plant was indoors, but some of its 
machinery and operations were outside and not covered in a way 
that precluded aerial surveillance, despite the presence of a nearby 
airport and frequent overflights by planes. The Supreme Court ma-
jority concluded that Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
because: 
[T]he open areas of an industrial plant complex with 
numerous structures spread over an area of 2,000 
acres are not analogous to the “curtilage” of a dwel-
ling for purposes of aerial surveillance, such an in-
dustrial complex is more comparable to an open 
field and as such it is open to the view and observa-
tion of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public air-
space immediately above or sufficiently near the 
area for the reach of cameras.147 
Among state and lower federal courts, there are dozens, if not 
hundreds, of cases exploring the reasonableness of a Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy under various fact patterns. 
Consider, for example, State v. Bryant,148 a 2008 decision by the 
Vermont Supreme Court, in which police used a helicopter to sur-
veil the defendant’s marijuana crop near his home. The state high 
court found that there was indeed a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy by the defendant because witnesses described the helicopter’s 
observation as “so long and so low and so loud.”149 The court 
found the flight (apparently made without cameras) to be “fifteen 
to thirty minutes of hovering over defendant’s property at altitudes 
of as low as 100 feet.”150 
These decisions, collectively, make clear that a rich body of law 
already exists that will help guide a principled approach to drone 
intrusion cases. Far from being an indeterminate question, Fourth 
Amendment law can provide resources—with necessary doctrinal 
                                                                                                                            
146 See id. at 229–30. 
147 Id. at 239. 
148 State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467 (Vt. 2008). 
149 Id. at 481. 
150 Id. at 475. 
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tweaks for tort purposes—to make sense of and provide predicta-
bility for the intrusion-by-drone context. 
One of the strong facets of intrusion as applied to drone-based 
newsgathering is that it carries the potential to strike the right bal-
ance from a First Amendment perspective. “Reasonable expecta-
tion” is an administrable standard that provides sufficient certain-
ty, while maintaining some flexibility, to provide the media with 
sensible guidance and notice regarding what conduct might be ac-
tionable. Furthermore, it does not overprotect privacy interests as 
some drone-specific legislation might—the “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person” element, while somewhat ambiguous, provides 
enough of a thumb placed down squarely on the First Amendment 
scale to safeguard a great deal of newsgathering conduct that is not 
strikingly unorthodox or outrageous. As the next Section reveals, 
however, intrusion is not the only legal theory of which broadcast 
journalists who deploy drones must be aware. 
C. Other Existing Legal Restrictions Facing Broadcast Drone 
Journalists 
In addition to the intrusion tort addressed above, several other 
legal landmines lurk for broadcast journalists who deploy drones. 
This Section provides a brief overview of them, with a primary fo-
cus on the common-law theory of aerial trespass. 
1. Trespass 
To prevail on a claim for trespass, a plaintiff typically must 
prove the defendant made an intentional, unauthorized entry onto 
property owned or controlled by the plaintiff.151 The notion of an 
aerial trespass has early roots in a seventy year-old U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, in which the Court remarked that “if the landown-
er is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive con-
trol of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”152 
Thus, the danger for drone journalists is that trespass principles 
may apply to aerial entries immediately above a person’s property. 
                                                                                                                            
151 See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (Ct. App. 1986). 
152 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (emphasis added). 
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The 2002 case of Bevers v. Gaylord Broadcasting Co., L.P.,153 al-
though involving a helicopter rather than a drone, is illustrative in 
this area. 
Bevers pivoted on the use of a television news helicopter flying 
over the residence of Gail Bevers to gather images for “a story 
about the poor condition of rental properties.”154 The Texas appel-
late court hearing the case reasoned that “one of the key facts in 
ascertaining whether a flight through airspace constitutes a trespass 
is the altitude of the aircraft.”155 Turning to the Restatement for 
additional guidance, the court found that an aerial trespass exists 
only if: (1) there is a “substantial interference”156 with the plain-
tiff’s use and enjoyment of the property; and (2) the aircraft travels 
within the “immediate reaches” of the land. On the case’s facts, 
the court held that “a single ten-minute hover over [Bevers’] prop-
erty at 300 to 400 feet does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level 
of ‘substantial interference’ with the use and enjoyment of the un-
derlying land.”157 After ruling against Bevers, the court declined to 
address “whether a flight at 300–400 feet was within the ‘imme-
diate reaches’ of the airspace.”158 
Broadcast journalists who use drones face the yet-unknown ap-
plications of aerial trespass law. Unfortunately, the law in this area 
remains unsettled and provides little guidance to journalists. Pro-
fessor Troy Rule, writing in a 2015 law journal article, aptly dubs it 
“the murky realm of aerial trespass because the upper boundaries of 
landowners’ airspace rights are largely undefined.”159 He explains 
that: 
In aerial trespass cases, courts must engage in sub-
jective and unpredictable inquiries into whether the 
alleged aerial intrusion penetrated the amorphous 
“immediate reaches” of the plaintiff’s airspace and 
                                                                                                                            
153 Bevers v. Gaylord Broad. Co., L.P., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5083 (App. July 18, 
2002). 
154 Id. at *2. 
155 Id. at *8. 
156 Id. at *16. 
157 Id. at *17. 
158 Id. at *17 n.3. 
159 Troy A. Rule, Airspace in the Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 170 (2015) 
(emphasis added). 
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whether such intrusion substantially interfered with 
the plaintiff’s “use” of her land. And in the case of 
alleged trespasses involving drones, a court could 
even elect to apply an altogether different rule based 
on a finding that a drone was more like a projectile 
than an aircraft.160 
Ultimately, the bottom line is that broadcast journalists today 
lack clear guidance about the rules regarding aerial trespass by 
drones. A very brief flight over property at 300 to 400 feet, howev-
er, could be safe if other courts adopt the logic of Texas appellate 
court in Bevers, absent a drone-specific statute to the contrary. 
That seems particularly true because a small-size drone appears 
less likely to substantially interfere with a landowner’s use and en-
joyment of property than a much larger news helicopter like that 
used in Bevers. 
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Over the years, broadcast journalists’ conduct has also been 
challenged under the legal theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress (“IIED”).161 The IIED tort requires a plaintiff to 
prove four elements: (1) the defendant engaged in extreme and out-
rageous conduct; (2) the defendant’s intent when engaging in that 
conduct was to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress or 
the defendant acted with reckless disregard of causing such dis-
tress; (3) the defendant’s conduct was, in fact, the actual cause of 
the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s emotional 
distress was severe, rather than minor or fleeting.162 
                                                                                                                            
160 Id.; see City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750, 758 (D.N.J. 1958) 
(noting that to prevail for aerial trespass, a plaintiff must prove “an unlawful invasion of 
the immediate reaches of his land; in other words, there must be evidence that the aircraft 
flights were at such altitudes as to interfere substantially with the landowner’s possession 
and use of the airspace above the surface”). 
161 See, e.g., KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Ct. App. 1995); 
Armstrong v. H & C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The IIED 
tort is sometimes called the “tort of outrage,” as it is in Florida. See Armstrong, 575 So. 2d 
281. 
162 Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause 
of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000). 
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Although the authors could locate not locate an IIED drone 
case on point, a plaintiff’s lawyer may argue that a news drone, ho-
vering for a sustained and prolonged period of time at a very low 
altitude above a person’s private home, could constitute extreme 
and outrageous behavior. For example, a paparazzo might use a 
low-hovering drone to record video of a celebrity swimming and 
sunbathing in her backyard. Or a drone journalist chasing a break-
ing-news story may capture aerial images of a hostage-taker’s arrest 
inside a walled compound. In either case, if the backyard was sur-
rounded by a high enough wall giving rise to an otherwise reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, it then is conceivable that the owner of 
either property would have viable causes of action for: (1) intrusion 
(discussed in Section B above); (2) trespass; and (3) IIED. In fact, 
this trio of torts has been successfully bundled together against 
broadcast journalists in a single lawsuit, albeit in a context pre-
dating drone usage.163 
3. Other Theories of Potential Liability for Drone Journalism 
Other legal challenges for broadcast journalists gathering news 
via drones include the possible use of anti-paparazzi statutes. For 
example, California has on the books an anti-paparazzi law for a so-
called “constructive invasion of privacy” that sweeps up drone use 
over private residences where people have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.164 Specifically, that statute holds civilly liable for treble 
damages a defendant who: 
[A]ttempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive 
to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression of the 
plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial 
activity, through the use of any device, regardless of 
whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression could 
not have been achieved without a trespass unless 
the device was used.165 
                                                                                                                            
163 See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving liability 
for intrusion, trespass, and IIED stemming from a media ride-along scenario). 
164 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2016). 
165 See id. 
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In light of this language, media defense attorneys Nabiha Syed 
and Michael Berry stress that “in California, drone operators need 
to understand that particular state’s anti-paparazzi law.”166 
Significantly, in October 2015, California Governor Jerry 
Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 856, which adds the words 
“airspace above the land of another” to California’s anti-paparazzi 
statute in order to prohibit “the use of drones to cross over fences, 
bypass gates and travel into private sanctuaries in order to peer into 
windows, capture goings on and otherwise spy on the private lives 
of public persons.”167 As the Los Angeles Times reported, the new 
law “expand[s] privacy protections to prevent paparazzi from fly-
ing drones over private property.”168 In fact, some California-based 
celebrities have claimed that drones spied on them, including sing-
er Miley Cyrus who reportedly “caught sight of a drone over her 
home [in 2014] . . . . She took video of the unmanned aircraft and 
posted it online.”169 
Some might wonder whether video voyeurism statutes apply 
when journalists use low-flying drones to capture images above a 
person’s house or even to peer into windows. The answer, general-
ly speaking, is no. That’s because the typical video voyeurism sta-
tute only applies if the defendant recorded images for a sexual pur-
                                                                                                                            
166 Syed & Berry, supra note 20, at 30. 
167 See Governor Brown Signs Calderon Legislation Prohibiting Use of Drones over Airspace 
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pose, arousal, or amusement, not when the purpose is to gather 
newsworthy information.170 
In summary, this Part illustrated that multiple theories of liabil-
ity already exist for broadcast journalists who use drones to cover 
news. These doctrines are in addition to the new state laws and 
pending legislation specifically targeting drones addressed earlier in 
Part I. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of newsgathering via drones is clearly in flux. The 
FAA’s highly restrictive stance at present is a major concern, but 
the authors believe that in the coming years news organizations will 
be given much freer rein to use the public airspace for their work. 
Once that occurs, the legal system will need to achieve some rea-
sonable balance between the First Amendment protected work of 
news organizations and the privacy and property rights of citizens. 
It is also imperative that the law be sufficiently well-defined and 
determinate to allow broadcast journalists to go about their impor-
tant work with a reasonable degree of certainty regarding what 
conduct may trigger legal consequences. 
As the preceding Parts made clear, a considerable body of exist-
ing tort law already protects people who believe they are victims of 
unlawful journalism. Extant legal templates—particularly, perhaps, 
the reasonable expectation jurisprudence developed in aerial 
Fourth Amendment law that can be brought to bear in intrusion 
doctrine—can guide the process of explicating rights between me-
dia outlets and citizens in a way that is sensitive both to nuance in 
individual cases and to the compelling imperatives of the First 
Amendment. The authors hope that state legislatures, driven by 
fears of a new and unfamiliar technology, will avoid a rush to enact 
untested and possibly extreme legislative solutions to problems that 
already are susceptible to resolution under existing tort doctrine. 
The hasty enactment of drone-specific legislation may be well-
intentioned, but it may also be hard to undo when the dust settles. 
Moreover, as one astute commentator put it, “rushing to enact 
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new laws could threaten to extinguish the nascent drone industry 
before it gets off the ground and before we fully understand drones’ 
potential uses and benefits.”171 That point is particularly salient 
when the “uses and benefits” involve a constitutionally protected 
activity such as newsgathering. 
California Governor Jerry Brown recently followed similar logic 
when he vetoed a bill that would have severely limited drone use in 
the California.172 In September 2015, Brown vetoed Senate Bill 142, 
which would have made anyone flying a drone at an altitude lower 
than 350 feet over private property liable for damages for “wrong-
fully occupy[ing] property.”173 Brown stated that the proposed law 
“could expose the occasional hobbyist and the FAA-approved 
commercial user alike to burdensome litigation.”174 Indeed, the 
National Press Photographers Association, along with California 
newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and Sacramento Bee, sent 
a letter to Governor Brown asserting that the regulations in Senate 
Bill 142 would be “impossible to comply with” and “impossible to 
enforce.”175 
Ultimately, drones will be used for gathering news. Some of 
those uses will be of high public significance, some less so. The au-
thors believe the existing array of remedies—along with a healthy 
respect for First Amendment values—can provide the resources to 
resolve the inevitable disputes that will arise. 
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